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Introduction
On the night of 25 February 1991 an Iraqi Scud missile penetrated Patriot missile defenses and 
slammed into the U S barracks m Dhahran Saudi Arabia killing twenty eight U S personnel 1 
Throughout the duration of the war Iraqi missiles terrorized Israel in an attempt to lure it into the 
war Despite the low accuracy of the Scuds and the fact they did not significantly threaten the 
allied forces they nevertheless forced the allies to expend time and energy on missile defenses 
and preparedness for the possibility of chemical attack behind the front line
In a broader sense though the potential impact of Iraq s missiles was far greater If Iraq had 
succeeded in getting Israel to retaliate the allied coalition most likely would have broken and the 
final outcome of the war would have fallen far short of the actual outcome Iraq might have 
retained a sizable armed force and weapons program (It was not until after the war that UN 
inspectors discovered Iraq s nuclear and chemical weapons program was more fully developed 
than had been assumed possible ) Foreseeing the potential break in the coalition U S forces 
expended significant resources to locate and destroy the Iraqi missile threat However despite this 
effort Iraq continued to launch missiles up to the very end of the war although the overall launch 
rate decreased It seems this unsophisticated straw missile almost broke the coalition camel s 
back Iraq was not deterred from launching missiles despite the obvious capability of the allied 
coalition to inflict a crippling blow on Iraq
As a result of the Gulf War the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its emphasis on 
theater missile defenses (TMD) with the goal of building more capable TMD systems to counter 
threats the United States is likely to face m future theater wars In support of this aim the United 
States began discussions with Russia regarding the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty The 
purpose of these discussions is to clarify the boundary between strategic missile defenses which 
are limited by the treaty and tactical and theater ballistic missile defenses which are not limited 
by the treaty
Will this effort to clarify the ABM Treaty undermine the purpose of the treaty9 Exactly what 
capabilities does the United States need for theater missile defense9 Does the ABM Treaty still 
serve a purpose or is it outdated9 Can we have both TMD and the ABM Treaty9 To what extent 
should the United States engage in cooperative TMD efforts with allies Russia or other states9
To answer these questions I will first review the historical factors that brought us the ABM 
Treaty as well as the purpose and results of the treaty This discussion will also summarize 
several significant events that have occurred since the treaty was ratified in 1972 The purpose of 
this review is to place the treaty in proper context and to establish a base for an analysis of 
current negotiations in the light of past events Since the current treaty negotiations concern the 
demarcation between the strategic defenses the treaty was designed to limit and others that are 
permitted I will begin by reviewing the reasons for and purpose of the ABM Treaty Without this 
understanding we might find ourselves undoing the past without wanting to do so
Second I will discuss the likely threat the United States will face in the near future from 
theater ballistic missiles This discussion will also include an analysis of efforts to control the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction Third I will discuss current
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 
Department of Defense the U S Government or the U S Air Force
1 Patriot Missile Defense GAO Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 
Committee on Science Space and Technology House o f Representatives (Washington D C US General Accounting 
Office February 1992) GAO/MTEC 92-26 p 1
2 Colonel Dennis D anielson
U S plans to develop effective TMD systems and the concerns that these systems might have a 
negative impact on the ABM Treaty Finally I will conclude with recommendations to resolve 
these concerns and at the same time meet the growing threat of theater ballistic missiles
Historical Factors Related to the ABM Treaty
The historical factors that are pertinent to our discussion of the ABM Treaty can be traced from 
the end of World War II through the Cold War that followed
The Cold War and the ABM Treaty
On 6 August 1945 the United States dropped the world s first nuclear weapon on Hiroshima The 
U S decision to use the bomb was based on the desire to make a profound psychological 
impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible with the hope its use would end the war 2 
On 9 August 1945 the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki Japan surrendered less than 
a week later Approximately one hundred thousand people died and another one hundred ten 
thousand were injured out of a combined total population of four hundred fifty thousand m the 
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki3 Though staggering the number of casualties at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki as a result of the atomic bomb were less for Japan and for the United States than if 
other military strategies were used to end the conflict A single conventional Tokyo air raid on 10 
March 1945 resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred thousand people alone 4 Based on the 
fight to the death reputation of Japanese soldiers throughout the Pacific theater the United 
States expected that Japan was capable of enduring and inflicting many more deaths if the war 
was to continue as it had been fought to that point With this perspective m mind use of the 
atomic bomb seemed an acceptable choice to President Harry Truman
While it ended one war the nuclear bomb took us into another the Cold War The 1950s and 
1960s were characterized by a seemingly endless expansion of U S and Soviet strategic military 
capability From the atomic bomb the hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) to sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) tactical nuclear weapons and multiple 
independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) the development of new and more effective offensive 
weapons and programs to build defenses and counter defenses seemed to go on without end
In the midst of this expansion m offensive capability the USSR sought to extend the 
influence of communism by significant increases m foreign aid and arms exports throughout the 
world Although most countries who received Soviet foreign aid did not adopt the Leninist idea of 
a revolution of the masses or embrace the ideology of communism most were eager to receive 
Soviet arms and supported at least some of the aims and goals of the USSR Soviet foreign policy 
was almost exclusively structured to counter the influence and threat perceived as coming from 
Washington (and to a lesser degree a competition from Beijing in Asia)
When the United States improved relations with Pakistan Iran and Iraq in 1954 and 1955 
the Soviet Union responded with foreign aid to Egypt India and Afghanistan Amencan influence 
in Israel and Jordan was met with Soviet assistance to Syria and Yemen The Soviets attempted 
to take advantage of every failure in Amencan foreign policy With Fidel Castro s successful 
revolution m Cuba m 1959 the USSR gained an open door into Amenca s backyard
Dunng the 1960s and 1970s Soviet aid was used to cultivate opposition to the United States 
and its policies throughout Latin America by supporting activities in Argentina Brazil Chile 
Mexico Nicaragua Peru and Uruguay When the U S relationship with Turkey was strained as a 
result of the 1964 cnsis in Cyprus the Soviets were quick to respond by befriending Turkey 
Though sidelined during the 1967 six day Israeh-Arab war and somewhat embarrassed by the
2 Vincent C Jones Manhattan the Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington D C  U S Government Pnnting 
Office 1985) p 532
3 Ibid p 547
4 William Craig The Fall o f Japan (New York N Y Dial Press 1967) p 25
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dismal performance of Soviet equipment in that conflict the USSR wasted no time in rearming 
the Arab states to the tune of $2 5 billion in 1967 and 1968 almost as much as had been given 
during the previous twelve years 5
Also during the 1960s and early 1970s the Soviets provided additional foreign aid to India 
and on occasion to Pakistan as a way to counter U S (and Chinese) influence Though 
seemingly not concerned about the growing U S involvement in Southeast Asia in the early 
1960s the USSR increased its supply of foreign aid and weapons to North Vietnam in 1965 and 
openly supported the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong throughout the war When African 
states broke free from colonial rule in the 1960s and early 1970s the USSR sought to take 
advantage of every opportunity Soviet aid went to support instability in Zaire and Nigeria in the 
1960s and in Somalia Angola Ethiopia Zimbabwe Namibia and South Africa in the 1970s 
Overall Soviet arms Sales went from $500 million a year in 1955 to $5 billion a year ir 1965 6
The rapid post World War II expansion of strategic weapons the clash of east-west ideology 
at numerous points throughout the world and the growing threat of a major nuclear conflict 
spurred efforts in the United States and in the USSR to develop civilian and national defenses 
The concern about nuclear war felt by people in the United States during the late 1950s led many 
to build backyard fallout shelters Schools instituted periodic air raid drills during which children 
were taught to crawl under their desks and to shield their eyes from the expected flash of the 
nuclear burst Both countries conducted research and development to find effective ways to 
defend against a missile attack and each made advances in technology to counter the expected 
defenses of the other (the United States development of the MIRV for example) Although the 
United States established an early lead in the development of nuclear weapons the Soviets did 
not remain far behind both sides acquired huge nuclear arsenals of ICBMs SLBMs and long 
range bombers
As each side worked on development and anticipated deployment of a national anti ballistic 
missile (ABM) defense system it became increasingly clear these defenses would only be 
marginally effective because of the superiority of offensive missile technologies including the 
use of decoys MIRVs and other penetration aids Namely deployment of a missile defense 
system would most likely result in still further increases m offensive strategic weapons in order to 
counter those missile defenses Therefore in 1969 the United States and USSR began negotiations 
to limit ABM defenses as a part of broader Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) m an 
acknowledgment that neither party could achieve superiority or lasting security by simply 
increasing its arsenal of strategic weapons
On 26 May 1972 President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed 
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems more commonly known as the ABM Treaty 
This treaty prohibits the United States and the USSR from deploying national ABM systems for a 
defense of the territory of its country 7 The treaty did however permit a very limited fixed 
ground based ABM system to protect one ICBM field and the nation s capitol The 1974 Protocol 
to the treaty further limits each nation to just one ABM site (either around the capitol or an ICBM 
field) The treaty defines an ABM system as a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles 
currently consisting of ABM interceptor missiles ABM launchers and ABM radars 8 The 
treaty also prohibits each side from giving non ABM missiles launchers and radars the 
capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight and prohibits
5 Joseph L Nogee and Robert H Donaldson Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War 11 (New York N Y Macmillian 
1992) p 194
6 Ibid p 175
7 Quote is from Article I of the treaty that reads as follows 1) Each Party undertakes to limit anti ballistic missile 
(ABM) systems and to adopt other measures m accordance with the provisions of this Treaty 2) Each Party undertakes not 
to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense and not to 
deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of the Treaty
8 See Article II paragraph 1 of the ABM treaty
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testing non ABM missiles launchers and radars in an ABM mode 9 These restrictions were 
designed to prevent the treaty from being circumvented by giving other systems an ABM 
capability
In conjunction with the ABM Treaty the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Interim 
Agreement was signed by the United States and USSR to freeze the number of ICBM and SLBM 
launchers SALT was not subject to ratification as a treaty because it was intended to be a short 
term agreement (up to five years) that would be superseded by a permanent treaty to reduce 
strategic arms
Significance of the ABM Treaty
The significance of the ABM Treaty is evident in the preamble that reads (emphasis added)
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all 
mankind considering that effective m easures to lim it anti ballistic m issile system s w ould be a 
substantial fa c to r  in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and w ould lead to a decrease in the 
risk o f  outbreak o f  war involving nuclear weapons proceeding from the premise that the limitation 
of anti ballistic missile systems as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of 
strategic offensive arms w ould contribute to the creation o f  more favorable  conditions fo r  fu rth er  
negotiations on limiting strategic arm s mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty 
on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest 
possible date the cessation o f  the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions 
in the strategic arms nuclear disarmament and general and com plete d isarm am ent desiring to 
contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States 
Have agreed as follows
As stated in this preamble the goal o f the treaty was to halt the race to produce more strategic 
weapons (missiles) by limiting defenses against such weapons The United States had gone from a 
1950s and 1960s nuclear strategy based on superiority to one based on the acceptance of eventual 
parity a strategy that became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
The earlier U S strategy of superiority had enabled the United States to exercise a strong 
hand during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis Air Force crews in nuclear armed bombers sat with 
engines running ready to respond to any conflict that might develop from a Soviet attempt to 
penetrate the U S blockade of Cuba The United States won the face off with the Soviets on the 
basis of a conventional and nuclear superiority But by the early 1970s the gap in strategic 
capabilities between the United States and the USSR had narrowed Each party had a reasonable 
degree of confidence that a substantial fraction of its strategic forces could survive the other s first 
use of nuclear weapons and therefore it was of limited utility to defend against such an attack 
The United States placed great confidence in its survivable SLBM force augmented by a strategic 
bomber and tanker force that remained on twenty four hour alert The Soviets depended more on 
their overwhelming superiority in the number of ICBMs m hardened silos
The second observation to make from the preamble of the ABM Treaty is both parties 
acknowledged a commitment and responsibility to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear 
weapons in accordance with the aims o f the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they signed in 1968 The 
ABM Treaty along with the SALT I Interim Agreement was expected to cap the arms race and 
form the basis for further agreements that would begin to reduce strategic arms
Results of the ABM Treaty
What did the treaty achieve9 What did it fail to accomplish9 From the 1970s through the mid 
1980s the Soviet Union increased its support of conflict aimed against the West In Africa 
(Angola Ethiopia) Central and South America (Cuba Nicaragua) Southwest Asia (Syria Iraq) 
South Asia (India) and Southeast Asia (Cambodia Laos) Soviet aid grew rapidly The Soviets
9 See Article VI of thè-ABM treaty
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became the leading world supplier of weapons with military aid over the period from 1978 to 1986 
totaling more than $137 billion 10 In addition Soviet military forces were used in a more active 
role than during the 1950s and 1960s In 1979 Soviet forces invaded neighboring Afghanistan 
demonstrating a resolve to commit troops to support socialist regimes against the West
In nuclear technology the Soviets were not content to achieve parity with the United States 
A U S  Defense Nuclear Agency report published in 1978 compared forty one different measures of 
U S and Soviet strategic forces from 1960 to 1980 The report showed at the time of the 1962 
Cuban missile crisis the comparison favored the United States by a wide margin However by 
the mid 1970s the Soviets were ahead m all but eight categories 11 Though some disputed Soviet 
technology had actually surpassed the United States no one argued with the fact the Soviets had 
rapidly closed the gap in the number of offensive weapons The USSR very quickly duplicated 
U S nuclear technology in almost every area and similarly in many areas of conventional 
weapons as well Duplication of U S technology was especially apparent m the similarity 
between Soviet and U S aircraft
The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement did not halt the increase in the number and 
capability of strategic warheads The United States and USSR continued to deploy additional 
warheads by deploying MIRVs that placed up to ten weapons on one missile While keeping 
within the Interim Agreement on overall limits in the number of ICBM and SLBM launch tubes 
the goal of limiting or reducing strategic warheads was circumvented As the Table 1 shows from 
1972 to 1985 the U S strategic warhead count went from approximately six thousand to more than 
ten thousand and the Soviet warhead count went from approximately twenty one hundred to 
approximately ten thousand while the total number of delivery systems (ICBM and SLBM launch 
tubes) remained relatively constant Each country continued to invest in technologies to improve 
accuracy survivability and reliability of its strategic systems during this period
The ABM Treaty did have two positive outcomes First the treaty saved the United States the 
expense of deploying and operating a large national missile defense system Both states were 
limited by the treaty (and the 1974 Protocol) to field only one ground based ABM site with a 
maximum of 100 ABM interceptors The United States initially deployed an ABM system (called 
Safeguard) near Grand Forks Air Force Base North Dakota but shut it down during its first year
Table 1 Comparison of U S and USSR Strategic Systems 1972 to 1990
1972 1980 1985 1987 1990
US
ICBM 1 054 1 054 1 018 1 000 1 000
SLBM 656 656 616 640 624
Bombers 455 338 180 317 306
Warheads* 6 000 7 301 10 174 13 873 9 680
USSR
ICBM 1 530 1 398 1 398 1 418 1 398
SLBM 500 1 028 979 928 924
Bombers 140 156 170 165 185
Warheads* 2 170 6 000 9 987+ 11 044 10 996
Source Information taken from various issues of The Military Balance published annually by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (Riverside N J Macmillian 1990-1991) 212 (1987-1988) 
225 (1985-1986) 180 (1990-1981) 3-4 90-91 (1972-1973) 84-85 Numbers used for bombers are 
generally long range bombers U S figures for 1972 and 1980 include FB I l l s US nuclear bomber force 
increased in 1987 with B 1 and conversion of older B 52 to nuclear ALCM role Figures do not show relative 
megatonage Figures do not agree with other open source information but should be taken as a relative 
measure of strategic capabilities 
Notes * Does not include tactical nuclear warheads
10 Ibid p 175
11 William R Van Cleave and W Scott Thompson Strategic Options for the Early Eighties monograph by National 
Strategy Information Center Inc (White Plains N Y Automated Graphic Systems Inc 1979) p 5
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of operation because of serious concerns about its operational and cost effectiveness Safeguard 
depended on an exo atmospheric (outer space) ABM interceptor called the Spartan and a lower 
altitude endo atmospheric interceptor called the Sprint Since both the Spartan and Sprint were 
nuclear tipped it was highly probable the nuclear effects of a few Spartan warheads would 
blackout the ABM radar and shoot itself in the foot so to speak (Note The Limited Test Ban 
was signed in October 1963 by the United States UK and USSR to prohibit outer space nuclear 
tests after it became obvious that other related nuclear weapons effects from actual tests had 
caused serious damage to satellites and global communication systems ) Even if all one hundred 
ABM interceptors worked as advertised they would hardly protect the United States against 
thousands of Soviet ICBM and SLBM warheads After the site was closed as an ABM facility the 
long range radar was converted to a missile warning and space surveillance facility and is still in 
use as of this writing Unlike the United States the USSR however continued to upgrade and 
maintain its nuclear tipped ABM system near Moscow
The second result o f the ABM Treaty Mas it kept the door open for talks to continue on the 
limitation and reduction of strategic weapons (SALT II START I and II) In practice the treaty 
created the appearance of a willingness to agree to reduce nuclear weapons without either side 
having to make any real sacrifices Article XIII of the treaty created a Standing Consultative 
Committee (SCC) that brought the United States and the USSR together on a regular basis to 
discuss a wide range of issues concerning the treaty such as clarifications possible violations 
proposed changes and so forth The treaty provided a starting point from which it was possible to 
discuss other negotiations about strategic weapons in general Although the United States and 
USSR continued to embrace opposing ideologies for many years each country remained 
committed to the belief the ABM Treaty was a worthwhile means to hold the other s strategic 
defenses in check
Significant Events Since the ABM Treaty
As was previously mentioned the period from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s was a time of 
unprecedented growth in the export of Soviet weapons and expansion of strategic forces Ronald 
Reagan was elected President in 1980 expressing a view shared by many Americans that the 
USSR was an evil empire In light of Soviet actions around the world Americans were not put 
at ease by the sustained strategy of MAD and the failure of the United States and the USSR to 
agree upon any reduction m strategic forces It was of little comfort to know the United States had 
no defenses against ICBMs while the Soviets had an ABM system that offered some (although 
disputably little) protection around Moscow
Throughout the late 1970s and early 80s both countries had substantial research programs 
underway to develop technologies that might increase their missile defense capabilities The 
United States effort to improve missile defenses came into prominence following a nationally 
televised speech made by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 In this speech Reagan announced 
the start of a major initiative that would have as its aim to field a strategic missile defense 
system to render ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete 12 President Reagan s idea quickly 
labeled Star Wars by its critics and the press became the Pentagon s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI)
As one might expect the Soviets were quick to express criticism of SDI as impractical 
unbelievable and also a violation of the ABM Treaty Privately they were probably concerned the 
United States might in fact have achieved a technical break through that would let it develop 
effective defenses and lead to a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—Article XV of the treaty 
allows either party to withdraw after a six month advance notice
As the SDI program got under way a debate soon developed over what was and what was not 
allowed by the ABM Treaty In October of 1985 President Reagan s national security advisor 
Bud McFarlane stated during a nationally televised interview that the President was
12 Address to the nation by then President Ronald Reagan televised on all major networks 23 March 1983
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guided by the ABM Treaty and the terms of that treaty are very explicit in Articles II III IV 
and V plus Agreed Statement D They make it clear that on research involving new physical 
concepts that that activity as well as testing as well as development indeed are approved and 
authorized by the treaty Only deployment is foreclosed except in accordance with Articles XIII and 
XIV 13
The debate grew into a major political battle among arms control advocates the administration 
Congress and the Soviets The traditional interpretation of the treaty (later known as the narrow 
interpretation ) was that the United States and USSR could not develop test or deploy any ABM 
systems except fixed ground based systems This view is based on Article V that reads in part as
Article V
1 Each Party undertakes not to develop test or deploy ABM systems or components thaï are sea 
based spaced based or mobile land based
In other words SDI efforts not devoted to fixed land based ABM systems were limited to 
research only
Mr McFarlane s statement challenged this point of view by claiming Agreed Statement D of 
the treaty (made at the time the treaty was signed) exempted new exotic technologies from the 
traditional interpretation Agreed Statement D states (emphasis added)
Agreed Statement [D]
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components 
except as provided in Article III of the Treaty the Parties agree that in the event A B M  systems based  
on other physical principles and including components capable o f  substituting fo r  A B M  interceptor 
m issiles A BM  launchers or A BM  radars are created in the fu tu re  specific lim itations  on such 
systems and their components would be subject to discussion  in accordance with Article XIII and 
agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty
The view expressed by Mr McFarlane became known as the broad interpretation Those 
opposed to the broad interpretation included most of the U S team that had negotiated the ABM 
Treaty
As the debate grew during the mid 1980s two extremes developed At one extreme SDI 
supporters wanted to press for an aggressive effort to develop and deploy a variety of space based 
and ground based ABM systems with or without the concurrence of the USSR (six month notice is 
all that is required to withdraw from the treaty) At the other end of the spectrum SDI opponents 
ridiculed the notion any such defenses were technically or economically possible and even SDI 
research would undermine the ABM Treaty In between these two extremes were those who 
approved of SDI research and although skeptical about it s potential wanted to keep options 
open Congressional restrictions attached to appropriations bills limited SDI expenditures to only 
those programs that could be conducted within the narrow or traditional interpretation
From my analysis of the events that occurred during the 1980s that relate to the ABM Treaty 
I identify two points as most important First President Reagan was sincerely motivated by a desire 
to nd the world o f the threat o f ICBMs He was led to believe SDI research could develop a 
capability to shield the whole world including the USSR and not just the United States from the 
threat of ballistic missiles At the Reykjavik conference m October 1986 President Reagan 
discussed at length a proposal to share strategic defenses and eliminate offensive ballistic 
missiles before deployment of defenses so neither side could have an effective first strike 
capability 14 At one point in the discussion the President expressed his desire to eliminate all 
nuclear weapons 15 However Mr Mikhail Gorbachev General Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party would make no agreement that did not include strict language to restrict SDI research to 
the laboratory
13 George P Schultz Turmoil and Triumph M \ Years as Secretary of State (New York N Y  Macmilhan 1993) p 
578
14 Ibid pp 754 761
15 Ibid p 772
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The second observation is thatthe Soviets were very concerned about SDI and feared American 
technology in general After the President s 1983 SDI announcement they sought at every corner 
to press the United States to limit SDI research and development At the same time several major 
trends were developing in the USSR The Soviet successes in the 1970s at home and abroad faded 
during the 1980s and by 1989 had given way to failures in agriculture the domestic economy 
technology and world trade The USSR had became the world s leading importer of grain 16 
Soviet military strength was slipping in comparison to the United States yet costing the Soviet 
government far more by comparison as a percent of gross national product (GNP) The USSR 
pulled out of Afghanistan with a sense of failure reminiscent of the U S withdrawal from Vietnam 
The USSR had few non military goods to offer the world or its own people Even its export of 
military goods began a rapid fall in 1987 from a 1986 high of 43 percent of the world s market to 
26per cent by 1991 17 In 1989 with the Warsaw Pact crumbling around them the Soviets were no 
longer in a position to negotiate from strength These facts coupled with the belief the U S 
Congress would keep (had kept) the Reagan and Bush administrations SDI efforts within the 
bounds of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty brought the USSR to a point where they 
were prepared to make significant reductions in strategic offensive weapons
Many SDI opponents claim SDI kept the United States from reaching early agreements with 
the USSR to reduce arms Conversely many SDI advocates claim it was in fact the U S 
position of strength based upon the threat of SDI that finally led to successful negotiations with 
the USSR I believe neither claim is completely correct but rather it was primarily the failure o f 
the Soviet system coupled with Soviet willingness to admit failure and recognize their inability to 
keep up with an expanding U S and Western economic and technical base that brought the Soviets to 
accept deep cuts in strategic weapons An honest self examination told the Soviets they could not 
continue to finance their security policy let alone upgrade it to stay on par with American 
technology The Soviets saw their only hope for survival was to reduce the size and expense of 
their military establishment so they could devote more resources to a grossly neglected Soviet 
society
As the world watched in amazement from 1989 to 1991 the Soviet Union let go of Eastern 
Europe the Warsaw Pact folded and the Berlin wall came down On 30 July 1991 President 
George Bush and Mr Gorbachev signed START in Moscow When fully implemented this treaty 
will cut strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs SLBMs and bombers) to sixteen hundred 
and countable warheads to six thousand an amazing reduction of strategic nuclear forces by 30 to 
40 percent
Almost immediately after START was signed a second round of talks began that were aimed 
at further reductions m nuclear forces At the same time the United States took all strategic 
bombers off alert status stood down all ICBMs that were scheduled to be deactivated under 
START halted development of the rail gamson MX the land mobile Midgetman ICBM and the 
Short Range Attack Missile II and announced plans to withdraw and destroy all nuclear artillery 
shells and all Lance nuclear warheads and remove all tactical nuclear weapons from U S surface 
ships and attack submarines Mr Gorbachev announced the USSR would respond in kind
In October 1991 the U S -USSR talks on reductions in strategic weapons were expanded to 
include representatives from the Soviet Republics that held nuclear weapons Russia Ukraine 
Kazakhstan and Belarus Following the demise of the USSR in December 1991 the Lisbon 
Protocol was signed in May 1992 by Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus and the United 
States Under this protocol the four republics of Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus 
accepted START treaty successor status In signing the protocol Ukraine Kazakhstan and 
Belarus agreed to accede to the NPT as non nuclear states
16 Nogee p 354
17 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report (Washington 
D C G PO 1994) p 17
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The START and post START discussions were accompanied by a series of less publicized 
space and defense negotiations about cooperation in missile defenses In January of 1991 
President Bush had concurred with a DOD proposal to develop a non nuclear US ABM system 
called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) This proposal represented an 
evolution of the SDI program combined with a variation of a December 1989 proposal from 
Senator Sam Nunn called Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS) 18 The concept of 
GPALS included a space based element that would not be in compliance with the traditional 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty With Iraq s use of missiles in the Gulf War that resulted in the 
deaths of American soldiers fresh in many minds the administration reinforced the argument that 
the United States needed a thin national ABM system to defend against the threat of an 
accidental or unauthorized missile launch or attacks from third world or terrorist states like Iraq 
As a result the Bush administration laid out proposals in the SCC for changes to the ABM Treaty 
that would permit the development of GPALS In July 1991 Mr Gorbachev proposed the 
development of a joint ABM early warning system to 'he Group of Seven (G 7) and in October 
1991 he further agreed to consider U S proposals for ABM systems He also tabled the idea of a 
joint ground and space based missile defense system 19
In November 1991 the U S Congress passed the Missile Defense Act that directed DOD to 
deploy by 1996 a single site ABM system that would comply with the ABM Treaty The Congress 
was no doubt influenced by the Bush administration s request for better missile defenses in light 
of the experiences of the Gulf War The Missile Defense Act also directed the Bush 
administration to discuss ABM Treaty amendments with the USSR that would permit a national 
ABM defense system and permit increased use of space based sensors for direct battle 
management These discussions were also to clarify with the USSR the rules for testing ABM 
defenses with space based components and the demarcation between theater and strategic ABM 
defenses However on Christmas 1991 the USSR ceased to exist
In January 1992 Mr Boris Yeltsin President of the newly independent Russian Federation 
echoed Mr Gorbachev s previous call for a joint ABM system In February 1992 at Camp David 
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin discussed the idea of joint defenses and shared concerns about 
threats not from each other but from third world terrorist regimes who might acquire nuclear 
weapons and missiles Finally in June 1992 Presidents Bush and Yeltsin issued a joint U S -  
Russian statement agreeing
that their two nations should work together with allies and other interested states in 
developing a concept for such a Global Protection System as part of an overall strategy to counter 
the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction 20
Their concept of a Global Protection System (GPS) called for a high level group to explore the 
potential for sharing early warning information through the establishment of an early warning 
center and the potential for cooperation with other states in developing ballistic missile defense 
technologies The high level group was also chartered to examine existing treaties and consider 
possible changes or the need to develop new treaties to facilitate GPS
The U S -Russian high level group met in July 1992 in Moscow The head of the Russian 
delegation was Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov the U S delegation was headed by 
U S Chief of State Department Policy Planning Dennis Ross The delegations agreed to create 
three lower level working groups to examine issues in more detail These working groups included 
a Global Protection System Concepts Working Group a Technology Cooperation Working Group 
and a Non Proliferation Working Group 21 they met in September and October 1992 Following the 
U S presidential elections in November 1992 U S -Russia talks were put on hold pending the 
change m the U S administration
18 A Chronicle of Treaties Negotiations Proposals Weapons & Policy Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge 
Mass IDDS 1989) 575 B 390
19 Arms Control Reporter (1991) 575 B 403 and 405
20 U S Department o f State Dispatch (20 July 1992) 571
21 Ibid
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Just prior to leaving office in January 1993 President Bush signed the START II treaty with 
President Yeltsin in Moscow When START II reductions are complete (by the year 2003 or by 
2000 with U S assistance to Russia) each side will reduce strategic warheads to 3 000 to 3 500 
limit SLBM warheads to 1 700 to 1 750 and eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs and all heavy 
(Russian SS 18) ICBM launchers in addition to the 1991 START reductions START II will result 
in a total reduction of U S and Russian strategic forces to about 25 percent of the pre START 
levels 22
In April 1993 at Vancouver President Bill Clinton had his first meeting with President 
Yeltsin The two agreed it is necessary to achieve the earliest possible resolution of questions 
about cooperation in nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology in all aspects 23 Later 
the same month President Yeltsin met with leaders of the Western European Union (WEU) and 
presented a proposal that the United States and Russia should establish a joint early warning 
center that would use information from U S and Russian early warning systems 24 His proposal 
called for joint discussion to examine the possibility WEU states could participate in GPS The 
Clinton administration responded to Yeltsin s proposal by announcing it would continue the joint 
missile defense talks with Russia begun under President Bush 25
Also in May 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspm announced the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization would be renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to reflect a 
change in the Clinton administration s focus from concepts that included space based global 
defenses to an emphasis on mobile TMD systems The Clinton administration proposed BMDO be 
funded at $3 8 billion for FY94 the same level of funding as in FY93 for SDIO Of this amount 
approximately $1 7 billion was requested for TMD an increase by about $700 million more than 
FY93 Only $1 2 billion was requested for strategic missile defenses 76 This increase in emphasis 
and funding for TMD fell m line with the results of Secretary Aspin s Bottom Up Review of the 
DOD The review released in October 1993 conceded the SDI research effort had failed to 
develop effective defenses against a large scale missile attack It also acknowledged President 
Clinton s skepticism about the need for GPALS and concluded the greatest future threat was from 
the proliferation of theater ballistic and cruise missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction 27 
Finally in December of 1993 and with inputs from the DOD State Department and National 
Security Council the Clinton administration initiated an effort to clarify with Russia the ABM 
Treaty as it pertains to strategic versus theater missile defenses
In summary concepts of missile defenses have gone from a limited ABM defense 
(Safeguard Nixon) no defense (Carter) a strategic defense umbrella (SDI Reagan) a limited 
national defense system (GPALS Bush) and an international global protection system (GPS 
Bush) to the current emphasis on mobile theater defenses over strategic missile defenses (TMD 
Clinton) With this history of missile defenses I will now turn to an assessment of the theater 
ballistic missile threat the United States faces and possible ways to meet that threat
Threat and Efforts to Contain the Threat
What threat does the United States face in the future from theater ballistic missiles9 Does a focus 
on the threat of theater ballistic missiles occur at the expense of ignoring threats from other 
delivery vehicles such as aircraft or cruise missiles9 What means are available to control the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles or nuclear biological and chemical weapons of mass 
destruction they might deliver and how effective are these means9 It is important to address 
these questions before we can conclude the United States needs such a capable TMD system it
22 Dispatch (4 January 1993) 5
'>3 Arms Control Reporter (1993) 575 B 427
24 Ibid
25 Space News 17-23 May 1993 p 2
26 Bruce C P Rayner From SDIO to BMDO Space Technology at the Crossroads Military & Aerospace 
Electronics 14 June 1993 p 17
27 DoD Report o f the Bottom Up Review (Washington D C GPO 1993) p 43 44
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must engage in a process to clarify restrictions set by the ABM Treaty a treaty that was designed 
to limit strategic missile defenses not TMD systems
In World War II Germany launched more than thirteen hundred V 2 ballistic missiles against 
London and more than sixteen hundred against Antwerp 28 In the manner of those fired by Iraq 
dunng the Gulf War the German V 2 missile was of little use against military targets but had 
significant use as a weapon of terror Sir Winston Churchill wrote that the V 2 imposed upon the 
people of London a burden perhaps even heavier than the air raids of 1940 and 1941 29 
Churchill s thoughts were echoed by British writer Norman Longmate who interviewed thousands 
of Londoners who experienced the V 2 attacks 30 Also in a manner similar to the Iraqi Scuds used 
during the Gulf War German V 2s diverted Allied military efforts from other operations to target 
V 2 launch sites The allies were just as unsuccessful in locating and destroying mobile V 2s in 
World War II as were the allied forces in finding Scuds dunng the Gulf War
Like a very long range piece of artillery the ballistic missile delivers a warhead with no 
warning Terrible enough as the delivery vehicle of a conventional warhead a ballistic missile s 
effects can be greatly multiplied with the use of a chemical biological or nuclear warhead 
These weapons of mass destruction (WMD) like conventional weapons can also be delivered 
via aircraft artillery and cruise missiles or by means of covert terronst actions But the ballistic 
missile stands above other means of delivery in its ability to deliver (as a function of the missile 
size and range) a large warhead long distances in the minimum amount of time and at a cost that 
is deemed affordable by many countries Once launched whether by intention or in error a 
ballistic missile cannot be recalled (Only test missiles normally have self destruct systems on 
board ) A ballistic missile requires no pilot and no in flight refueling or stop at an enroute airfield 
Because the ballistic missile travels at a significantly higher velocity than an aircraft and is a 
smaller target the problem of defending against ballistic missiles is a far greater challenge It is 
precisely because of these factors that the German V 2 was viewed as a more serious threat to 
Londoners and caused serious morale problems despite the fact there were only about twenty five 
hundred deaths in London from V 2s compared to more than five thousand deaths from the V 1 
cruise missile and more than one hundred twelve thousand from aircraft31 It is because of the 
inherent capabilities of the ballistic missile (warhead delivery weight range speed and problems 
to defend against) that the ICBM and SLBM more so than the intercontinental bomber form the 
basis of U S and USSR or Russian strategic nuclear forces
Dunng the Cold War a number of countries acquired first generation theater ballistic missiles 
Scuds were used by Egypt in the 1973 war more than six hundred Scuds were launched dunng the 
Iran-Iraq war from 1987-1988 and at least two thousand Scuds were used by the Soviets in 
Afghanistan between 1988 and 199 1 32 Table 4 (Appendix) contains a list of countries that 
currently have ballistic missile systems of concern to the United States
One of the first observations to be made from an examination of this list is to note the shear 
number of countnes that have missiles It should come as no surpnse then to learn the missile 
programs of one country have been aided by technology from a number of other countnes Iraq s 
missile program for example was the beneficiary of many years of assistance from Argentina 
Brazil Germany North Korea and the USSR 33 With help from Brazilian technicians and extra 
fuel tanks from North Korea Iraq modified the Scud B to extend its range to 600 kilometers 
creating a missile Iraq called the al Hussein The approximately eighty one Scud missiles Iraq 
launched during the Gulf War were mostly al Husseins Prior to the Gulf War Iraq had other
28 Gregory S Jones The Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program The Gulf War and the Future of the Missile Threat 
monograph published by the American Institute for Strategic Cooperation Summer 1992 p 11
29 Winston S Churchill Triumph and Tragedy (Boston Houghton Mifflin Company 1953) p 39
30 Norman Longmate Hitler s Rockets The Story o f the V 2s (London Hutchinson & Co 1985) pp '’25-239
31 Robin Ranger Theater Missile Defense Lessons from British Experiences with Air and Missile Defense 
Comparative Strategy 12 (1993) 399-413
32 Duncan Lennox Battling with the Ballistic Threat Jane s Defence Weekly 20 March 1993 p 26
33 Arms Control Reporter (1991) 706 B 54-55
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modification programs underway to create a 900 kilometers version (the al Abbas) and a 2 000 
kilometers three stage vehicle (the al Aabed) as well Iraq had announced in December 1989 that 
it had successfully completed the first test in the development of this rocket34 Finally Iraq had a 
second program to develop a three stage missile with the assistance of several German companies 
using the two stage Condor II from Argentina as a base 35
Another observation to be made from Table 4 (Appendix) is that a significant number of third 
world countries have the Scud and Frog missiles These missiles were obtained from the USSR 
China or North Korea Countries that have supplied assistance (technology components or both) 
to others are shown in Table 2 Although most countries have depended upon outside help to begin 
their missile development programs a number of countnes now have a largely indigenous missile 
program of their own Argentina Brazil China India Israel North Korea Libya and Pakistan
Given that many countries have felt it necessary to acquire ballistic missiles and given that 
these missiles are particularly threatening when armed with WMD what course of action should 
the United States take to improve its security as well as international security as a whole9 I will 
answer this question by first reviewing what has been done thus far to control the proliferation of 
WMDs as well as the proliferation in ballistic missiles
Geneva Protocol of 1925
Negotiations among many countnes after World War I led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 This 
protocol prohibits the use of Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bactenological Methods of 
Warfare 36 However the protocol does not ban production of these weapons and permits 
signatones to use chemical and biological weapons against non party states in retaliation against 
not observing the provisions Unfortunately the Geneva Protocol has no compliance or 
venfication regime As of January 1993 one hundred and thirty countries were party to the 
Geneva Protocol37
Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968
Negotiations to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons were concluded in 1968 with the 
signing of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) The treaty divides the world into haves and 
have nots Currently the declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) include the United States 
Russia (as successor to the USSR) the United Kingdom France and China All other parties to 
the treaty are Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) The NWS agree not to assist any state in 
acquiring nuclear weapons and agree to assist NNWS with peaceful nuclear programs The 
NNWS agree not to acquire nuclear weapons but may receive assistance and technology to 
develop nuclear power facilities or other non weapon related nuclear programs Compliance with 
the treaty is venfied with the assistance of inspections conducted by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) As of December 1993 there were 162 NPT states 38
Table 2 Countnes Supplying Missie Technology Assistance and/or Components
Countries Supplying Assistance Countnes Receiving Assistance
Argentina Egypt Iraq
Brazil China Iraq Libya
France Israel Pakistan
Germany Brazil Iraq Libya
Israel South Africa
United States Israel S Korea Taiwan
34 Ibid (1990) 706 B 24
35 Ibid (1991) 706 B 55
36 Ibid (1992) 860-61 1
37 Ibid (1993)
38 Ibid (1994) 602 A 10
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Biological Weapons Convention of 1975
After years of negotiations specifically devoted to ban the production of biological weapons the 
United States and USSR reached agreement on a convention in 1970 and subsequently submitted 
it to the United Nations The UN General Assembly approved a resolution commending the 
provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that finally went into effect in 1975 
This convention bans development production stockpiling and use of biological agents As of 
January 1994 the BWC had been ratified by 133 countries (some by accession or succession)39 
Like the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that preceded it the BWC makes no provision for verification 
and compliance However members are currently considering proposed ways to establish formal 
verification procedures A ban on production of biological weapons is inherently difficult to verify 
because of the relative ease with which a state can covertly develop biological weapons under 
the guise of a medical or biological research program Such weapons can be produced from 
commonplace readily available materials
Missile Technology Control Regime of 1987
Concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missiles seven Western states began negotiations in 
1983 to seek export controls over ballistic and cruise missile technology In 1987 they reached an 
agreement called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) The MTCR initially 
restricted exports of missiles with a nuclear payload capability (500 kg was deemed the smallest 
practical weight for a nuclear warhead) and a range greater than 300 kilometers (deemed the 
shortest range for tactical use with a nuclear weapon) In 1993 MTCR membership approved 
changes to control the export of any missile (or system) with a range greater than 300 kilometers 
regardless of payload This change was designed to expand the MTCR restrictions to cover 
chemical and biological weapons as well as crude nuclear weapons that could be designed with a 
net warhead mass under 500 kg As of December 1993 twenty five countries had joined the 
MTCR40
Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993
Following a path somewhat parallel to the BWC the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
resulted from a series of U S -USSR (later U S -Russia) bilateral talks and was signed by 125 
countries in January 1993 The CWC will not go into force until two years after sixty five or more 
states ratify the treaty Only four states had ratified the CWC as of January 1994 41 President 
Clinton forwarded the treaty to the U S Senate for ratification in April 1994 42 Compliance with 
the treaty will be verified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
in a manner similar to the IAEA for NPT
Effectiveness of Non Proliferation Efforts
How effective have these efforts been to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles or weapons 
of mass destruction9
BWC In January 1993 the U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) issued a 
report that said eight countries most likely had biological weapons programs and stockpiles 
(China Egypt Iran Iraq Libya, Taiwan Russia and Syria) despite the fact they are signatories 
to the BWC 43 In the case of Iraq UN inspectors determined after the Gulf War that Iraq had 
conducted research but had no biological weapon productions program 44 Russia on the other
39 Ibid (1994) 701 A 3
40 Ibid (1994) 706 A 2
41 Ibid (1994) 704 A 2
42 Theresa Hitchens Clinton Urges Swift U S Ratification of Chemical Treaty Defense News 18—^4 April 1994 
P 12
43 Arms Control Reporter (1993) 701 B 107
44 Ibid 1994 p 701 A 4
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hand has acknowledged its program had in fact continued until 1992 45 Open sources list up to 
eight additional states beyond these listed by ACDA that probably have clandestine offensive 
biological weapons 46 With the uncertainty it is even possible to develop an adequate verification 
or compliance regime it will be difficult to either confirm or dispute the existence of such 
programs
NPT Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons India and Pakistan are believed to have the 
capability to quickly produce them None of these countries are members of NPT nor does it 
seem they are inclined to join anytime soon North Korea although a signatory of the NPT is 
suspected of having one or two nuclear weapons and of producing additional fissile material with 
the intent to produce more nuclear weapons For more than a year North Korea has repeatedly 
blocked the IAEA s attempts to inspect cerain facilities in accordance with its commitment 
under the NPT Despite a year of discussions among North Korea the United States China and 
the United Nations and despite threats of sanctions and loss of trade North Korea continues to 
refuse the IAEA at the time of this writing
As mentioned earlier Iraq—who had ratified NPT in 1969—had developed a much more 
extensive nuclear weapons program before the Gulf War than had been suspected by outside 
observers Open sources identify ten undeclared nuclear weapons states either having or having 
previously had the intent and capability to produce nuclear weapons 47 Two of these states 
Argentina and Brazil have subsequently declared their intent to cease pursuit of nuclear weapons 
however neither have joined the NPT as of the time of this writing 48 South Africa declared it had 
produced six nuclear weapons but subsequently dismantled them it joined the NPT as a NNWS 
in 1991 The activities of these states demonstrate it is possible to skirt the NPT if a state is 
inclined to do so
A handful of other states pose the potential for concern because of their modern technical 
capabilities in spite of no present obvious intent to develop a nuclear weapon This list includes 
Japan South Korea and Taiwan In addition there is a growing concern that a number of third 
world countnes will be able to purchase Russian nuclear weapons and material from Russian 
organized crime groups if reports prove true that organized crime is eroding the government s 
control of its stockpile of nuclear material 49
MTCR The proliferation of ballistic missiles may have already surpassed the ability of the 
MTCR to exercise any significant influence to reduce the number of states that are developing or 
acquiring ballistic missiles (see Table 4 Appendix) In 1993 two incidents occurred that serve to 
demonstrate how difficult it is to control the exportation of missile technology because of the 
conflicting interests between export control and efforts to promote commercial trade or other 
national goals The first situation involved Russia that was pressured by the Clinton administration 
to break its contract to supply India with liquid fueled (cryogenic) rocket engines and technology 
in support of India s space program Instead of canceling the contract entirely Russia will provide 
India with the engines but not the technical data that would allow India to produce its own liquid 
fueled engines In exchange the United States made Russia a full partner in the U S led 
international space station and pledged $400 million to support Russia s space program 50 India 
responded with criticism of U S intervention in its contract with Russia but stated the 
interference had only nuisance value and India was self sufficient both m design and in
45 Ibid 1992 p 701 B 97
46 U S Congress Office of Technology Assessment Report Proliferation o f Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Washington D C  GPO August 1993) p 65
47 Ibid
48 Arms Control Reporter (1994) 602 A 7
49 Seymour M Hersh The Wild East The Atlantic Monthly June 1994 p 61
50 Paul Mann U S Russia Draft Histone Space Pact Aviation Week and Space Technology 6 September 1993 p
22
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missile technology 51 Ironically the space station program faces the possibility of being 
canceled because of cost52
The second incident concerns the U S accusation that China violated the MTCR by selling 
M 11 missiles to Pakistan On 25 August 1993 the State Department issued a statement that the 
United States would impose limited two year sanctions on munitions and dual use items and 
denial of U S government contracts with China and Pakistan because of the missile transfer53 
China responded by denouncing the sanctions as unjustified and based on inaccurate 
intelligence 54 In addition the sanctions impacted several U S space corporations with potential 
losses totaling more than $400 million in the sale of six satellites to China In November 1993 
the administration considered waiving sanctions in exchange for a promise from China not to 
violate the MTCR again 55 However the administration decided in the end to let four of the six 
satellites go without constraint deeming they had no MTCR controlled components The other 
two satellites contained MTCR controlled items which when replaced by alternate components 
were also sold to China
CWC The CWC is not yet in force but already a variety of open sources list up to eleven 
countries believed to posses offensive chemical weapons capabilities 56 Only time will reveal if 
the CWC will have greater effectiveness than either the BWC or NPT in limiting proliferation
Analysis of Nonproliferation Efforts and Threats
The result o f the overall non proliferation effort is a record of mixed success No single effort has 
stopped proliferation At best the non proliferation regimes have made it more difficult but not 
impossible for states to develop WMDs or ballistic missiles
At the heart of the problem are two fundamental issues The first relates specifically to the 
nature of NPT As long as the NPT retains its discriminatory nature that permits the five Nuclear 
Club members to have nuclear weapons and denies other states the same opportunity there will be 
states such as India that will not join the NPT India developed a nuclear capability m response to 
China s nuclear threat as well as to make a statement to the world that India deserves respect as 
a prominent state As a state with almost one fifth of the world s population the largest 
democratic state in existence India sees the nuclear bomb as a ticket into the circle of world 
powers What does India have to gain by giving up this advantage and taking what it sees is a 
back row seat with the third world 7
The other fundamental issue relates to nonproliferation efforts in general States develop 
security policies in response to their threat perceptions For example Pakistan has acquired a 
nuclear capability primarily in response to India s military strength and overall capability 
Pakistan uses India as a reason not to sign the NPT But even if India was to join the NPT 
Pakistan might nevertheless be tempted to keep a nuclear production capability m response to 
India s overall superiority in conventional forces for the same reason NATO depended on tactical 
nuclear forces to balance the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact Having lost three wars 
with India that resulted in the loss of territory (East Pakistan and land claims in Kashmir)
Pakistan foreign policy reflects an acute awareness of the country s strategic vulnerability Why 
should Pakistan give up its claim to nuclear weapons when it feels it has been put at arms length 
by the United States whom it once viewed as a close friend and ally7 The 1985 Pressler 
Amendment to Amenca s Foreign Policy Assistance Act said aid to Pakistan would be contingent 
upon the President s ability to confirm Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb American aid 
stopped after 1990 when it was no longer possible for the President to certify Pakistan did not
51 Our God Can Lick Your God India Today 28 February 1994 p 26
52 NASA White House Juggle Space Station Pnce Tag Aviation Week and Space Technology 18 Apnl 1994 p 
59
53 China and Pakistan M -l 1 Missile Sanctions U S Department o f State Dispatch (30 August 1993) 607
54 Lena H Sun China Says U S Sanctions are Entirely Unjustified Washington Post 27 August 1993 p ~>1
55 Jeffrey R Smith US Offers to Waive China Trade Sanctions Washington Post 11 November 1993 p 39
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have a nuclear weapons program As a consequence Pakistan has yet to receive F 16s and other 
military equipment for which it had previously paid $1 3 billion It is not surprising Pakistan may 
feel that it cannot depend upon the United States to protect its interests 57
These two issues a state s concept of what it must do to achieve world status or regional 
recognition and the concept of what each state must do to preserve its national security will 
forever create challenges and frustrations for nonproliferation efforts I do not suggest we should 
abandon current nonproliferation efforts but that one must be honest and acknowledge the reality 
of their limits Nonproliferation efforts although commendable in many ways have not eliminated 
the threat many states face from ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads or WMD and 
cannot be expected to do so entirely For a variety of reasons many countnes are aggressively 
developing new theater ballistic missiles with longer ranges and greater capabilities despite the 
MTCR
The threat that drives the need for TMD capabilities may be summarized as follows The Gulf 
War for the first time brought the United States into an engagement with an enemy who 
possessed and used theater ballistic missiles potentially armed with WMDs Fortunately Iraq did 
not use the chemical missile warheads it had in stock in contrast to its use of chemical armed 
artillery in the Iran-Iraq War More fortunately Iraq had not yet achieved a nuclear capability In 
light of the limitations of many nonproliferation efforts and in light o f the number of countries that 
have active programs to produce better ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction the 
United States cannot expect to be as fortunate the next time around The United States must develop a 
capable mobile TMD system While it is true the United States proper is not directly threatened 
by any country with theater ballistic missiles if the United States deploys forces again to the 
Middle East as it did in Dessert Storm it will find itself once again facing theater ballistic 
missiles Similarly U S forces m South Korea are under the threat of ballistic missile attacks 
from North Korea In addition many of our allies are under an increasing threat from theater 
ballistic missile in their regions Clearly it is within the U S national security interest to be able 
to assist its allies in meeting such threats
U S TMD Systems and the ABM Treaty
With the preceding assessment of the threat and a review of the limits of nonproliferation methods 
in mind I will now turn to a discussion of present and planned U S TMD systems This discussion 
will also address the current effort to clarify the ABM Treaty s distinction between tactical TMD 
systems and strategic ABM systems and address specific concerns that TMD efforts might 
undermine the ABM Treaty and plunge the United States and Russia back into a strategic arms 
race I will conclude this discussion with recommendations to resolve these concerns and meet 
the growing threat from theater ballistic missiles
U S TMD Systems
What capability does the United States currently have to defend against ballistic missiles9 
Having dismantled the Safeguard ABM system in 1976 the United States has been without any 
ABM defenses against strategic missiles The only U S theater ballistic missile defense system is 
the Army s Patriot missile system The Patriot was originally designed by the U S Army in the 
1960s as an anti aircraft missile However it was modified under a program that began in the 
early 1980s to give it a TMD capability in response to the Soviet buildup of theater ballistic 
missiles in Europe During the same penod the Soviets modified some of their air defense missile 
systems for a similar TMD role (SA 10 and SA 12 for example)58
The first real test for any of these modified surface to air missile (SAM) systems was the 
Patnot s debut during the Gulf War Early reports of the Patriot missile s success in the Gulf War 
gave way after the war to varying degrees of criticism about the missile s overall performance in
57 Asia the Subcontinent s Own Cold War The Economist 25 December 1993—7 January 1994 p 43
58 Lennox p 26
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both Saudi Arabia and Israel The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported to the Congress 
in April 1992 there was insufficient data (in the GAO s opinion) to support the U S Army s claim 
that the success rate of the Patriot was 80 percent in the Saudi Arabian theater and 50 percent m 
Israel59 One of the most critical reviews of the Patriot came from General Dan Shomron the 
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Force dunng the war General Shomron stated in regards to the 
Patriots used to defend Israel I can say with confidence that one Scud missile exploded in the 
air from a Patriot And there were close hits and diversions But in the terms that I would define as 
success I cannot talk about great successes 60
Another assessment of the Patriot s performance m Dessert Storm was done by Drs Theodore 
Postol and George Lewis of MIT who based their conclusions upon analysis of video taped Patriot 
missile engagements They stated there is strong evidence that its interceptors failed to destroy a 
significant number of attacking Scuds 61 The Raytheon Company which makes the Patriot 
missile refutes the Postol-Lewis analysis and supports the U S Army s conclusions 62
However successful the Patriot was during the war the operation served to highlight the need 
to develop more capable TMD systems and focused attention on the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles and WMDs Since the war the DOD has taken a number of significant steps to improve 
the Patriot and develop an integrated TMD program that involves the efforts of all the services 
This integrated effort under the direction of BMDO uses a multi layered defense architecture 
similar in pnncipie to the concept developed by SDIO and earlier against ICBMs This integrated 
effort seeks ways to target theater ballistic missiles throughout their time of flight from launch to 
a point just before impact
Missile launches can be detected by Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites built during 
the Cold War to detect launches of long burning hot ICBM missile plumes Despite their limited 
ability to detect shorter burning and relatively cooler theater ballistic missiles DSP satellites did 
provide allied forces in the Gulf War with a limited amount of Scud launch data including general 
launch and impact point locations General Merrill McPeak USAF Chief of Staff commented 
that for the USAF in particular Desert Storm really opened our eyes to the need for and use of 
space based systems such as DSP 63 As a result of the Gulf War the USAF has initiated a intense 
effort to integrate information from DSP and other satellites and aircraft equipped with advanced 
synthetic aperture radar electro optical sensors infrared sensors and moving target radar with 
high speed communications and data processing In future conflicts this integrated data would be 
sent near real time to theater forces 64
Along with this effort is another USAF initiative to develop a high speed interceptor missile 
to be carried by an airborne fighter or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and fired at a theater 
ballistic missile dunng its boost phase Integrated launch information from sensors in space will 
enable the fighter or UAV to target the ballistic missile Another more exotic air force program 
proposes to employ an airborne laser to track and kill a ballistic missile dunng its boost phase 65 
The USAF is also testing a concept that will enable fighters to use integrated information to help 
them quickly locate and target mobile launchers within minutes after a launch before they have 
time to relocate 66 The obvious advantage of a boost phase intercept is the ballistic missile
59 Operation Desert Storm Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed GAO Report to 
Congressional Requestors (Washington D C  GPO September 199'») GAO/NSIAD 92 340 pp 1-3
60 Translation of video taped interview in Tel Aviv Israel on 14 September 1993 by Reuven Pedatzur
61 Theodore A Postol Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot International Security (Winter 1991/9"’) 
170
62 Robert M Stem Correspondence Internal" nal Security (Summer 1992) 199
63 Speech by Gen Merrill A McPeak The Air Force Role in Space given at the ninth space symposium Colorado 
Springs 15 April 1993
64 David Hughes Mitre Air Force Explore Data Fusion for Joint STARS Aviation Week and Space Technology 7 
March 1994 p 47
65 Barbara Starr USAF Seeks Airborne Laser Development. Jane s Defence Weekly 2 October 1993 p 16
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Table 3 Summary of TMD Systems
Categorv of Intercept TMD System
BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT Fighter or UAV equipped with air to air missile
UPPER TIER INTERCEPT
Land based THAAD
Sea based THAAD or LEAP
LOWER TIER INTERCEPT
Land based Patriot or ERINT Corps SAM
Sea based Standard Missile
warhead is destroyed over the head of the enemy This opportunity is particularly important if the 
missile is carrying early release munitions or any WMD because the dispersal of chemical or 
biological agents or nuclear fallout will be over enemy territory
The next layer of defense consists of a two tier (upper and lower) TMD system being 
developed primarily by the U S Army for land based defense and the U S Navy for sea based 
defense The purpose for the two tier system is to intercept intermediate range missiles (1 000 to 
3 500 kilometers) while they are above the atmosphere (above 100 kilometers ) before they arrive 
in the vicinity of their intended target As in the case of a boost phase intercept an upper tier exo 
atmospheric intercept will keep the dispersal of any chemical or biological agent or nuclear 
fallout as far away as possible If the missile is not intercepted until it approaches the intended 
target a successful intercept might result in the dispersal of some portion of the agent The lower 
tier provides defense m depth to limit leakage In addition the lower tier is also needed to target 
shorter range ballistic missiles (less than 1 000 kilometers) that spend most or all of their time of 
flight within the lower atmosphere
The primary candidate system for land based upper tier defense is the Theater High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) being developed by the U S Army For sea based upper tier TMD the 
U S Navy is considering both the Army s THAAD and another program called the Light Exo 
Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP)
The lower tier land based TMD system is the Patriot As previously mentioned the U S Army 
is making improvements to the current Patriot system (radar software command and control and 
interceptor) Under a competitive program to improve the capabilities of the Patriot interceptor 
missile the U S Army recently selected the Loral Vought Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) 
over an improved Patriot missile from Raytheon 67 The Army hopes to compliment the Patriot 
with an additional more mobile lower tier system called Corps SAM The U S Navy is 
developing its sea based lower tier TMD by modifying its Standard Missile and Aegis SPY IB 
radar that like the Patriot was originally designed for an anti aircraft role 68 Table 3 summarizes 
these TMD systems
Concerns about TMD and ABM Treaty Clarifications
Does this concept of a multi layered TMD system potentially undermine the purpose of the ABM 
Treaty9 Recall from our discussion above the purpose of the ABM Treaty was to prohibit the 
United States and the Soviet Union from developing national anti strategic ballistic missile 
defense systems to insure each party could survive a first strike from the other with enough 
strategic forces to retaliate However the treaty does not define the term strategic ballistic 
missile
The absence of such a definition caused no problem when the United States had no ABM 
capability theater or strategic When the Patriot was modified to defend against short range
67 David Hughes Army Selects ERINT Pending Pentagon Review Aviation Week and Space Technology 21 
February 1994 p 93
68 John Haystead Next generation Missile Systems Take Off Military & Aerospace Electronics 19 July 1993 p
17
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theater ballistic missile this lack of definition also caused no problem because the Patriot posed 
no threat to strategic ballistic missiles But now as the United States seeks to give greater 
capability to TMD systems the demarcation between theater and strategic becomes more 
important If the United States develops TMD systems with the capability to be used (or even 
potentially be used) m an ABM role as defined by the ABM Treaty then it will have 
circumvented the treaty m a way that could significantly undermine its purpose and value
The recent discussions with Russia regarding the ABM Treaty are intended to clarify the 
demarcation between ABM systems limited by the treaty and TMD systems not limited by the 
treaty The United States and Russia have both expressed a desire to keep the ABM Treaty alive 
to limit strategic ABM defenses for the same original reasons envisioned when the treaty was 
signed The goal of the discussions is to keep TMD systems from undermining the intent of the 
treaty
Recommendations
What then should be the demarcation between theater and strategic ballistic missiles9 In 1972 
the United States and USSR had SLBMs in service with maximum ranges of less than 3 000 
kilometers 69 SLBMs have always been treated as strategic missiles and included as part of the 
overall strategic force structure whatever their range because their fundamental mission was the 
same as other longer range ICBMs However when START II is completed the United States and 
Russia will be left with no strategic ballistic missiles with a shorter range than 6 500 kilometers 70
As Table 4 (Appendix) shows the majority of theater ballistic missiles in existence or under 
development have a range of less than 1 500 kilometers Exceptions include ballistic missiles (in 
existence or under development) in Brazil China India North Korea and Saudi Arabia By 
selecting 3 500 kilometers as the boundary between theater and strategic ballistic missiles the 
North Korean Taepo Dong 2 falls within the targeted range o f potential TMD missiles This range 
does place the French S 3D (3 500 kilometers ) within the classification of a theater ballistic 
missile and the British SLBM Polaris A 3 (4 600 kilometers ) and French SLBM M 4 (5 000) are 
only slightly beyond this theater limit which brings our discussion to a more difficult problem
How can one distinguish a TMD system designed to kill a theater ballistic missile with a 
range of 3 500 kilometers from a system with some capability against a ballistic missile with a 
range of 4 600 kilometers (such as the British A 3) or for that matter a missile with a range of 
6 500 kilometers (such as the Russian SS N 18)9 Recall that the ABM Treaty prohibits either 
party from giving non ABM systems the capability to counter strategic missiles The problem 
with this stipulation is it was written during a time in which there was less concern that a number 
of third world countries would develop 1 500 to 3 500 kilometers range theater ballistic missiles 
The treaty s absence o f a distinction between strategic and theater reflects the fact the treaty was 
tailored for a situation in the Cold War that is no longer current In 1972 the United States and 
USSR perceived that the primary threat to their national security was from each other s growing 
ICBM and SLBM force However this East-West Cold War focus has been diluted by a different 
situation today A growing threat has arisen particularly for Russia that comes from instability m 
Central Eastern and Southern Asia as well as from the Middle East Although the possibility of a 
U S nuclear engagement with Russia has not been eliminated it is much more likely the next 
U S conflict will be a regional conflict involving theater ballistic missiles from a country other 
than Russia We have to face the fact that an effective TMD system might have some degree of 
capability against a strategic ballistic missile The solution therefore is to
(1) agree upon the demarcation between theater and strategic
(2) agree upon a qualitative limit for TMD systems
69 The range of the U S Polaris A2 was approximately 2 900 kilometers the range of the USSR SS N 4 was only 
about 600 kilometers The Military Balance ¡971-1972  57
70 Based on the range of the U S Tndent C4 missile of 7 400 kilometers and the Russian SS N 18 missile of 6 500 
kilometers The Military Balance 1992-1993  228 ">34
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(3) seek to establish confidence building measures to reinforce each country s commitment 
to the ABM Treaty
(4) honor the ABM Treaty s prohibition not to test a TMD system against a strategic 
missile
There are several measures that can serve to build confidence that neither party is 
intentionally giving ABM capabilities to TMD systems One confidence building measure (CBM) 
is to open all TMD testing and operational training to observation from the other party Such on site 
observation would insure that TMD systems are developed within agreed limits and that neither 
party is testing or training operators to use TMD systems against strategic missiles No country 
will put confidence in any weapon system it has not tested nor expect its military to employ a 
weapon in a manner in which they have not been trained
Another CBM is to give full disclosure o f the size mobility and location o f each deployed TMD 
system as well as prior notification of any redeployment Garrison for TMD systems should not be in 
a location that affords protection to either party s ICBM fields or other strategic targets 
Verification can be done with on site inspection as well as from spaced based surveillance 
Disclosure of critical information about TMD systems would help to insure neither side is 
attempting to position TMD systems in a manner to create a national ABM system
A third CBM is to share early warning information Current U S and Russian early warning 
networks can provide processed data to each other through commercial links General Charles 
Homer commander of U S Space Command (previously commander of air operations in the Gulf 
War) described this CBM as a vital step in building trust because the United States would not 
give away its early warning information if it wanted to preserve a first strike capability 71
But what about U S allies Britain and France7 Even if the United States and Russia agree 
on a demarcation between ABM and TMD systems does such an agreement not force Britain and 
France to accept that their shorter range SLBMs will be vulnerable to TMD systems7 How about 
China7 Should the United States ignore the concern China may have if Russia develops TMD 
systems that would have some potential capability against shorter range Chinese strategic 
missiles7 I will answer these questions indirectly by discussing the growing concerns Britain and 
France also have about the threat of theater ballistic missiles
As previously mentioned the United States and Russia—earlier the United States and 
USSR—are discussing the possibility of shanng early warning information as well as the 
possibility of developing joint TMD systems The United States is also a party to similar 
discussions with NATO 72 In addition the United States has discussed TMD options with Japan73 
and is cost shanng the development of a TMD system (the Arrow) with Israel74
In response to U S -Russian discussions about TMD the WEU began its own talks in 1992 
about the need for a European TMD system 75 The WEU planned to consider participation in the 
Bush and Yeltsin proposal of GPS as well as an independently developed European missile 
defense system citing Libya Syria and Egypt as countries of particular concern The WEU also 
directed its members to conduct a study of a European TMD system based upon components of 
planned U S TMD systems In June 1993 the WEU passed a resolution to initiate through the 
United Nations the formation of art international early warning and surveillance center 76
71 Jeffrey M Lenorovits U S Russia to Share Missile Warning Data Aviation Week & Space Technology 11 
April 1994 p 24
72 Brooks Rigner NATO Pursues Ballistic Missile Defense Defense News 24-30 January 1994 p 4
73 David E Sanger New Antimissile System for Japan Is Under Discussion with the U S New York Times 18 
September 1993 p 1
74 Israel Aims Arrow 2 at Scud Threat Washington Times 2 February 1994 p 13
75 Aviation Week and Space Technology 18 January 1993 p 25
76 WEU to look into early warning center European Defense System Inside the Army 28 June 1993
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In September 1993 France initiated discussions with Russia to consider development of a 
cooperative TMD system that would make use of Russian SA 12 technology 77 France sees this 
cooperative initiative as an initial step toward developing a broad European TMD system 
designed to defend against projected North African and Middle East ballistic missiles with ranges 
of 1 500 to 3 000 kilometers Britain has also launched a study to examine its own requirements 
for a TMD capability and plans to consider purchasing systems such as the U S THAAD and 
ERINT 78 It seems France and Britain even more than the United States have reason to be 
concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missile and WMDs
All of these discussions underscore the shared view in Europe that there is a growing threat 
from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMDs There is general agreement between the 
United States and Russia and within NATO that it is necessary to develop effective TMD 
systems to meet this threat Therefore this mutual concern coupled with effective CBMs forms 
the basis for permitting deployment in a way that will not undermine the ABM Treaty China s 
response is much more difficult to determine At some poin China must be brought into the 
equation On the positive side China s inclusion creates the opportunity to address a possible long 
term solution to the threat of ballistic missile proliferation
Any long term solution must jointly consider the threat from nuclear weapons as well as 
ballistic missiles To arrive at a long term solution the United States should initiate a 
comprehensive round of talks with NATO Russia China other U S allies such as Japan and Israel 
and with the members o f the MTCR to agree upon a time frame to ban all ballistic missiles and 
ultimately to eliminate all nuclear weapons The Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty 
signed m 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union has already demonstrated the potential 
of such a ban with its elimination of all U S and USSR ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 
and 5 500 kilometers As the next step toward a total ban on all missiles other countries should 
be invited to join the INF treaty To compliment this effort the United States should create a 
framework that provides early warning information to other states and allows them to purchase TMD 
systems in exchange for their demonstrated commitment to eliminate ballistic missiles and WMD 
This framework might initially include an international early warning center and could evolve to 
include several centers (U S Europe Russia and Asia) Another option would be to provide early 
warning information via commercial satellites to member states Cooperative warning can be 
developed using present U S and Russian early warning systems Other states with surveillance 
systems (French Spot satellite for example) could be invited to share information that can be 
used to provide verification and compliance assurance to members of the organization The center 
would not replace but rather would augment the work of existing verification and compliance 
regimes such as IAEA for NPT and OPCW for CWC
During the Cold War the United States justified building and deploying a nuclear arsenal 
because it believed the country needed a force multiplier to deter a numerically superior Soviet 
force The United States must now realize that other countries are using the same logic to justify 
programs to develop their own weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to deliver 
them But as the Gulf War demonstrated the United States no longer needs nuclear weapons as a 
force multiplier Precision air power clearly brought Saddam Hussein to his knees with less 
collateral damage and injury to civilians than during any previous military campaign The United 
States did not need nuclear weapons during the Gulf War and will not need them in the future except 
as a deterrent to other states who have them or might acquire them Our only current justification for 
keeping strategic weapons especially ICBMs and SLBMs is because Russian and China possess 
them General McPeak has described ballistic missiles as destabilizing because they leave 
virtually no time for questions and evoke a use it or loose it kind of psychology on the 
receiving end 79 A discussion among the five declared NWS—all have ballistic missiles armed
77 Craig Covault Russian SA 12 Missiles Eyed for European ABM Aviation Week and Space Technology 13 
September 1993 p 99
78 Charles Miller Bntish Weigh Missile Defense Plan Defense News 21-27 February 1994 p 38
79 James W Canan Deterrence Across the Spectrum Air Force Magazine February 1991 p 27
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with nuclear warheads—could lead to a joint agreement similar to the START agreements that 
would ultimately eliminate all ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons This effort would provide 
credibility to our appeals for states like India and Pakistan to join NPT as NNWS
Summary
The ABM Treaty was designed to limit U S and Soviet defenses against strategic missiles in 
order to contain the nuclear arms race It has performed this task very well As our discussion has 
shown however the ABM Treaty did not reduce the number of U S and Soviet strategic 
warheads but by limiting missile defenses the treaty contributed to deterrence by giving each 
party a reasonable guarantee it could survive a first strike from the other As long as the United 
States and Russia possess strategic missiles the ABM Treaty continues to fulfill this purpose
Since the treaty was signed in 1972 the world has witnessed a significant increase in the 
number of and use of theater ballistic missiles Despite a coordinated effort on the part of many 
states to limit the proliferation of ballistic missiles through the MTCR the spread continues 
Efforts to control the proliferation of chemical biological and nuclear warheads has produced 
mixed results Until such time as it is clear that U S forces are not likely to face threats from 
theater ballistic missiles potentially armed with WMDs as they did in the Gulf War the United 
States needs to have a highly effective theater missile defense capability Although the primary 
theater ballistic missile threat today is from short range ballistic missiles several countries are 
developing intermediate range theater ballistic missiles that will likely be exported to other 
countries The United States needs to be prepared to meet this longer range threat as it develops
Given that the ABM Treaty did not offer a clear distinction between limited strategic ABM 
defenses and unrestricted TMD systems the United States and Russia must clarify this 
distinction The United States and Russia as well as our closest allies must accept the fact that 
it is not possible to create effective TMD systems that simultaneously have no capability against 
strategic ballistic missiles Therefore this effort to agree on mutually acceptable TMD 
capabilities should include confidence building measures to help reinforce the commitment to 
abide by the basic purpose of the ABM Treaty
We have discussed the fact that some states have a ballistic missile and a nuclear weapons 
program or both as a result of a desire to achieve world or regional prominence Other states have 
similar programs in response to the threat they perceive from neighboring states A number of 
countries are unlikely to agree to abandon their nuclear weapons programs as long as the NPT 
divides the world into haves and have nots In recognition of this fact the United States 
should seek a more permanent long term solution to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
nuclear weapons although a senes of international discussions to establish a time frame for a ban 
on all ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons This ban can be enhanced by an offer to share early 
warning information and TMD systems to member states in order to reinforce each member s 
commitment to the ban While this effort will not eliminate a threat from other delivery vehicles 
(such as aircraft cruise missiles and artillery) it will eliminate the most destabilizing threat of 
ballistic missiles Only if the United States takes the lead in this effort and if other nuclear 
weapons states agree will it be likely that the threat of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear 
weapons will cease Until that time the threat will continue to grow and states will continue to 
take the action they believe necessary to defend their interests
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Appendix
Table 4 Countries with Ballistic Missiles of Concern to the United States____________
______ C ountry____________ M issile______ Rang e( KM)_______________________C om m ents
Afghanistan Frog 7 70
Scud B 300
Algeria Frog 4 50
Frog 7 70
Argentina Alacran 200
Condor I 95
Condor II 900
Brazil MB/EE 150 150
SS 300 300
MB EE/350 350
MB EE/600 600
MB EE/1000 1 000
SS 1000 1 200
IRBM 3 000
Sonda 3 80
Sonda 4 950
VLS 10 000
Bulgaria Frog 7 70
Scud B 300
SS 23 500
China M 7 180
M 11 300
M 9 600
M 18 1 000
CSS N 3 (JL 1) 1 700
DF 25 1 700
CSS 5 (DF21) 1 800
CSS 2 (DF 3) 2 800
CSS 3 (DF 4) 7 000
JL 2 8 000
DF 31 8 000
CSS 4 (DF 5) 12 000
DF 41 12 000
Croatia Scud B 300
Cuba Frog 7 70
Czech and Frog 7 70
Slovak Republics SS 21 120
Scud B 300
SS 23 ’ 500
Egypt Frog 7 70
Scud B 300
Project T 450
Vector 600
Scud 100 600
Hungary Frog 7 70
Scud B 300
India Centaure 50
Rohini
Pnthvi (SS 150)
130
Pnthvi (SS 250) 250
SLV 3 800
Agni 2 500
ASLV 4 000
PSLV 8 000
GSLV 12 000
D
D
Agreed to stop production under MTCR being dismantled
D
D
D
D
D
D
Planned
Sounding Rocket 
Sounding Rocket
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
Sounding Rocket 
Sounding Rocket
Space Launch Vehicle 
D
Space Launch Vehicle 
Space Launch Vehicle 
Planned Space Launch Vehicle
(co n tin u es)
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Table 4. (continued)
Country Missile Rangel KM) Comments
South Africa Jericho II 1,450
Arniston 1,500
South Korea Honest John 37
NHK-1 180
NHK-2 260 D
Serbia Frog-7 70
Spain Capricornio 1,300 D
Syria Frog-7 65
SS-21 120
Scud-B 300
Scud-C 500
M-9 600
NoDong-1 ? 1.000
Taiwan Honest John 37
Ching Feng 100
Tien Ma ? 950
Turkey Honest John 37
ASR-227 150
United Arab Emirates Scud-B 300
Vietnam Scud-B 300
Yemen Frog-7 65
SS-21 120
Scud-B 300
Source: Information compiled from a variety of sources: Arms Control Reporter (1993): 706.E.7-11 and 
(1994): 706.E. 1-8; Arms Control Today (April 1994): 29-30; Barbara Starr, “N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow 
with TD-2,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 March 1994, p. 1; The Military Balance 1992-1993: 236.
Comments: This list of missiles includes sounding rockets, space launch vehicles, and missile development 
programs some of which may have been discontinued. All three categories are included because the 
technology is largely common to a ballistic missile program and thus reflects an overall capability for a 
given country. The list does not include Russia or any other former republics of the USSR. Missile range 
varies with the source.
Notes: D, in development.
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